On-site auctions – Sometimes when the stock or assets of a company are simply too vast or too bulky for an auction house to transport to their own premises and store, they will hold an auction within the confines of the bankrupt company itself. Bidders could find themselves bidding for items which are still plugged in, and the great advantage of these auctions taking place on the premises is that they have the opportunity to view the goods as they were being used, and may be able to try them out. Bidders can also avoid the possibility of goods being damaged whilst they are being removed as they can do it or at least supervise the activity.
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By the end of the 18th century, auctions of art works were commonly held in taverns and coffeehouses. These auctions were held daily, and auction catalogs were printed to announce available items. In some cases these catalogs were elaborate works of art themselves, containing considerable detail about the items being auctioned. At this time, Christie's established a reputation as a leading auction house, taking advantage of London's status as the major centre of the international art trade after the French Revolution.

GAUK Police Auctions & Sales category lists everything you need in an easy to read page outlining all the details of Police Auctions within the UK. In an attempt to stop the lost and found departments becoming crammed and to reduce the number of items stored in the Police Property Store UK police forces sell consignments of stolen and recovered and seized goods through a Police Auction. These sales include vehicles, bicycles, clothing, electronics, furniture and many other items, which end up in the police property room.


... Bourjade (2009) modified the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders and proved that this rules provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion and then many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear. Brenner et al. (2009) investigated the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions and found that the majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism for issuing government debt, and they also concluded that market-oriented eco- Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 2015, 21(1): 96-117 nomies and those that practice common law tend to use a uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice civil law tend to use discriminatory price auctions. Holmberg (2009) characterized the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid, divisible-good, pro- curement auction, and compared the offer curves and mark-ups of the derived equilibrium to the results for the SFE of a uniform-price auction. ...
Due to the various governmental units that supply the vehicles for auction, there's no single reason for vehicles being brought to auction. Some of the vehicles are confiscated due to the former owner's involvement in drug dealing, smuggling, or fraud, while other vehicles were simply just abandoned. On exception, separate auctions will sometimes be held for very large seizures.
Many financial assets, especially government bonds, are issued by an auction. An important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism: uniform versus discriminatory. Theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the dominance of one type of auction over the other. We investigate the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions. We find that the majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism for issuing government debt. We use a multinomial logit procedure and discriminatory analysis to investigate the mechanism choice. It was interesting to find that market-oriented economies and those that practice common law tend to use a uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice civil law tend to use discriminatory price auctions.
Participants in any Treasury auction consist of small investors and institutional investors who submit bids categorized as either competitive or non-competitive tenders. Non-competitive tenders are submitted by smaller investors who are guaranteed to receive bills, but they won’t know what discount rate they will receive until the auction closes. In effect, these investors receive no guarantee on the price or discount received. An investor who submits a non-competitive bid agrees to accept whatever discount rate is decided at the auction, determined by the competitive side of the auction which is handled as a Dutch auction. The minimum non-competitive tender for a Treasury bill is $10,000. The non-competitive closing time for bills is normally 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time on auction day.
Another approach to choosing an SOB: The auctioneer may achieve good success by asking the expected final sales price for the item, as this method suggests to the potential buyers the item's particular value. For instance, say an auctioneer is about to sell a $1,000 car at a sale. Instead of asking $100, hoping to entice wide interest (for who wouldn't want a $1,000 car for $100?), the auctioneer may suggest an opening bid of $1,000; although the first bidder may begin bidding at a mere $100, the final bid may more likely approach $1,000.
Lots at police auctions range from brand new or graded from A down in used condition, or goods may be slightly marked. A good example would be high quality white goods. All items listed in any police auction are available for viewing and inspection prior to the sale. Faulty or damaged goods should be clearly marked, and faults are outlined by the auctioneer during the auction.

One way the federal government finances its activities is by the sale of marketable Treasury bills, notes, bonds, Floating Rate Notes (FRNs), and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) to the public. Marketable securities can be bought, sold or transferred after they are originally issued. Treasury uses an auction process to sell marketable securities and determine their rate, yield, or discount margin. The value of Treasury marketable securities fluctuates with changes in interest rates and market demand. You can participate in an auction and purchase bills, notes, bonds, FRNs, and TIPS directly from the Treasury or you can purchase them through a bank or broker. Marketable securities held in your account can be sold at current market prices through brokers and many financial institutions.

Many financial assets, especially government bonds, are issued by an auction. An important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism: uniform versus discriminatory. Theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the dominance of one type of auction over the other. We investigate the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions. We find that the majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism for issuing government debt. We use a multinomial logit procedure and discriminatory analysis to investigate the mechanism choice. It was interesting to find that market-oriented economies and those that practice common law tend to use a uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice civil law tend to use discriminatory price auctions.
The Auction Catalog has been prepared as a guide, and should be used as a guide only. Although the descriptions are believed to be correct its accuracy cannot be guaranteed or warranted. The Bidder acknowledges that all auction items are available for inspection prior to the auction and it is the Bidders responsibility to have inspected the item before bidding. No sale shall be invalidated; nor shall auctioneers be liable as a result of defects or inaccuracies of any lot.

The District of Columbia now auctions its surplus property online through GovDeals, a Liquidity Services, Inc. marketplace. The district awarded the contract for the management of the inventory, appraisal, sale and shipping of the city's surplus property to Liquidity Services Inc. LSI conducts auctions of city assets such as vehicles, police automobile accessories, computer equipment, radios and other communications equipment, office furniture and other supplies through its online marketplace. The auctions are expected to improve data tracking and financial oversight of the city's surplus asset disposition activities. 
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